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China’s influence on Taiwan’s media and politics
Abstract: Taiwan’s democracy and freedom of the press provide the Chinese authorities with an op-
portunity to use Taiwanese businessmen to influence Taiwan’s media outlets and politics. China uses 
three inter-related strategies to influence Taiwan’s media in this way: persuading businessmen with 
pro-China views to purchase Taiwanese media outlets, pressuring existing media owners, and placing 
advertisements in Taiwan’s media in order to purchase political influence. In addition, the Chinese gov-
ernment also employs cyber-propaganda strategy to attack Taiwanese political parties and politicians.
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In the early 1990s Taiwan began to democratize under President Lee Teng-hui, a process that included gaining freedom of the press. President Chen Shui-bian further promoted 
a policy of “Regulation to Remove Political Parties, the Government and the Military 
from the Media” (Dangzhengjun tuichu meiti tiaokuan 黨政軍退出媒體), which his 
government implemented in 2003. Consequently, Taiwan’s media became more diverse 
and competitive. However, Taiwan’s freedom of the press and capital markets provided 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC) an opportunity to influence Taiwan’s free-wheel-
ing media and politics. From the early 2000s, the PRC employed clandestine media war-
fare against Taiwan. China first used Hong Kong and other overseas media to attempt to 
influence public opinion in Taiwan (Tao Sheng-ping 陶聖屏, Lin I-chin 林宜瑾, 2007, 
pp. 31–52). Later, the PRC employed Vladimir Lenin’s idea, “The easiest way to capture 
a fortress is from within.” They also practiced “using businessmen to surround the gov-
ernment” (yishang weizheng 以商圍政), in an effort to unify Taiwan with the Chinese 
mainland (Tao Sheng-ping 陶聖屏, Lin I-chin 林宜瑾, 2007, p. 40).
Since 2008, after Ma Ying-jeou’s victory in the presidential election, Ma’s policy of 
closer economic integration with China, as well as Tsai Eng-meng’s 蔡衍明 takeover 
of the China Times Group in 2008, China has deeply influenced Taiwan’s media. The 
PRC urged the unification of Taiwan with China, and the PRC regarded propaganda as 
an important tactic in its United Front strategy against Taiwan. The PRC’s media strat-
egy against Taiwan has three inter-related approaches. First, the PRC uses tycoons with 
pro-China views to purchase Taiwan’s media. Second, the PRC pressures media pro-
prietors who have invested or intend to invest in China. Third, the PRC uses embedded 
advertising/advertorials in Taiwan’s media to influence the media’s outlets and public 
opinion. These approaches by China have had some success in influencing Taiwan’s 
media, and they have worried many in Taiwan. The controversy over the proposed sale 
of the pro-democratic Taiwan Next Media became a trigger for many Taiwanese to op-
pose China’s “black hand” in Taiwan’s media. Many domestic and overseas Taiwanese 
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students launched an “Anti-Media Monopoly” movement against Tsai Eng-meng and 
China’s “black hand.”
The pro-China views of Tsai Eng-mend and the Want Want China Times Group
The owner of the Want Want China Times Group, Tsai Eng-meng, is a Taiwanese 
businessman who started to invest in China in 1989 when most countries boycotted 
China because of the Tiananmen Square Massacre. In an interview with the Washington 
Post in January 2012, Tsai Eng-meng denied that there had been a massacre in Tianan-
men Square during June 3–4 1989. This interview clearly disclosed Tsai’s pro-Beijing 
views. In addition, many stories published in the China Times (Zhongguo shibao 中國時
報) also showed the Chinese authorities’ deep influence on the Want Want China Times 
Group.
The China Times Group of Yu Chi-chung 余紀忠 included the China Times, the Chi-
na Times Express (Zhongshi wanbao 中時晚報), and the Commercial Times (Gongshang 
shibao 工商時報). In 2002, the China Times merged with CTi TV (Zhongtian dianshi 
中天電視). In 2005 it further merged with China TV (Zhongshi 中視), and the Broad-
casting Corporation of China (Zhongguang 中廣; BCC) (which the KMT had owned), 
to become a media conglomerate with newspaper, TV and radio holdings.1 After the Tsai 
Eng-meng 2008 takeover of the China Times Group, the group began to publish the Want 
Daily (Wangbao 旺報) in 2009 and the online English Want China Times in 2010.
After Tsai Eng-meng, tycoon of the Want Want Group took over the China Times Group 
in November 2008 and re-named it the Want Want China Times Group; there was con-
troversy over the unusual relationship between the Chinese government, Tsai Eng-meng, 
and the Want Want China Times Group. According to Poe Ta-chung 卜大中,2 a venture 
of Next Media which publishes the Apple Daily, had intended to purchase the China 
Times Group for approximately ten billion Taiwan dollars (more than US$300 million). 
Next Media spent several months calculating the value of the China Times Group and 
examining its financial statements. However, just before the deal was to go ahead, Tsai 
Eng-meng suddenly called the owner of the China Times Group, Yu Chien-hsin 余建新, 
the son of the late Yu Chi-chung, offering to purchase the China Times Group for double 
the price offered by Next Media (Poe Ta-chung 卜大中, 2012). Tsai Eng-meng obtained 
ownership of the China Times Group for 20.4 billion Taiwan dollars on November 3, 
2008 (Chao Chih-ling 趙芷菱, 2009).
Many have questioned whether the Chinese government was involved in financing 
Tsai Eng-meng’s purchase of the China Times Group. Several sources have indicated 
that the Chinese government has repeatedly tried to purchase Taiwanese media to influ-
ence the Taiwanese people. According to Tung Li-wen a huge amount of capital from 
the Taiwan Affairs Office of the Chinese State Council, totaling US$300 million, was 
transferred to Taiwan and Hong Kong from China in 2007 with the goal of purchasing 
Taiwanese media (Tung Li-wen 董立文, 2011). Thus, Tsai Eng-meng’s purchase of the 
1 In December 2006, the China Times Group sold BCC to former Chinese New Party Secretary-
General Jaw Shao-kong 趙少康.
2 Poe Ta-chung is the former Deputy Editor-in-Chief of the China Times.
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China Times Group created many doubts in Taiwan about the role of China in his pur-
chase. In 2009 Tsai Eng-meng also acknowledged that he knew the Taiwan Affairs Office 
had commissioned agents to purchase the China Times Group, but Tsai denied he was the 
agent (Tien Shih-hao 田世昊, 2009).
Despite Tsai’s denial, some sources pointed to the close relationship between Tsai 
Eng-meng and the Chinese authorities. According to an interview with a senior Taiwan-
ese government official, the Publicity Department of Central Committee of the Commu-
nist Party of China became involved in Tsai’s purchase of the China Times Group.3 This 
senior government official further said in an interview that, according to an unidentified 
source, the Publicity Department of the CPC Central Committee did not want to see Next 
Media take over the China Times Group. Therefore, the publicity department ordered the 
Taiwan Affairs Office to intervene. The Taiwan Affairs Office cooperated with a senior 
KMT leader, to convince Tsai Eng-meng to purchase the China Times Group.
Some other accounts demonstrate Tsai’s close relationship with the Chinese authori-
ties. Some two weeks after Tsai’s purchase of the China Times Group, on November 16, 
2008 Tsai Eng-meng gave orders to the senior managers of the China Times Group to: 
strongly support the Ma Ying-jeou administration, to clear up misunderstanding between 
Taiwan and China, and to avoid discussing unification and independence in media of the 
China Times Group. However, these senior managers interpreted Tsai Eng-meng as having 
said that the China Times Group must suppress Taiwanese Independence (Chen Mien 陳免, 
2008, p. 8). One month after Tsai Eng-meng’s purchase of the China Times Group, on 
December 5, 2008, Tsai visited the Director of the PRC’s Taiwan Affairs Office, Wang 
Yi, in Beijing. Tsai reported his success in buying the China Times Group, and relayed 
his intention to improve the development of Cross-Strait relations (Lin Hsing-fei 林幸
妃, 2009, pp. 35–38). According to an interview with a former senior editor from the 
China Times, in early 2009 Tsai Eng-meng said at an editorial meeting that “suppress-
ing” the Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989 was necessary and that even the Americans 
would have done so. Tsai further said that the Tiananmen Square “Massacre” was just 
the propaganda of Western countries.4 The informant argued that Tsai’s point of view 
on the Tiananmen Square Massacre was the same as the Chinese authorities. Later, the 
informant indicated that Tsai had also implied that the China Times could not discuss 
the issues of Tibet and Xinjiang (East Turkistan). During the negotiation of the Eco-
nomic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), Tsai gave an order that the China 
Times could not report or publish any news or comment against either ECFA or the 1992 
Consensus.5 According to this informant, in early 2009 Dr. Honigmann Hong 洪財隆 
published an article in the China Times to criticize the ECFA (Honigmann Hong 洪財隆, 
2009). As this article dissatisfied Tsai Eng-meng, the China Times did not allow Hong to 
publish any further articles on the ECFA. The informant concluded that the China Times 
editors self-censored, with regard to China-related issues.
Some other indicators also illustrate the unusual relationship between Want Want 
and the Chinese authorities. Firstly, despite Want China Times’ announcement of being 
3 The author conducted this interview in Taipei on 9 January 2012.
4 The author conducted this interview in Taipei on 14 August 2012.
5 The initial term for ECFA was the Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA). 
The Ma Ying-jeou government re-named it ECFA in late February 2009.
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based on “Taiwanese spirit,” a remarkable amount of their news items were drawn from 
the English edition of the official Chinese Xinhua News Agency, according to the same 
interviewee above. The Want China Times seems to be a representative of the Xinhua 
News Agency in Taiwan. Secondly, another anecdote about the Want Daily also indicates 
the influence of China on the China Times Group. The Want Daily published a daily fea-
ture, “Today’s History Across the Strait.” On June 4, 2010. This feature discussed a story 
of June 4, 1983 on Taiwan, and a story of June 4, 1985 from China, but no mention was 
made of the Tiananmen Square Massacre of June 4, 1989. This edition of the Want Daily 
aroused many Internet users to condemn the Want Daily for concealing the Tiananmen 
Square Massacre in China. Finally, the Chinese government’s industrial subsidies for 
Want Want China, demonstrated Want Want’s close relationship with the PRC. In 2011, 
Want Want China received a subsidy of US$47 million dollars, accounting for 11.3% of 
its annual net profit, from the Chinese government (The Economist, 2013).
Many criticisms were made in Taiwan condemning the China Times for pandering 
to China. For example, in January 2010 the China Times unexpectedly discharged Hsia 
Chen 夏珍 from his position as Editor-in-Chief because of a headline on December 26, 
2009. The headline quoted a Taiwanese official’s remark that the PRC’s Chairman of the 
Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Strait, Chen Yunlin 陳雲林, was unimport-
ant in China. President Ma Ying-jeou expressed his disagreement with this characteriza-
tion of Chen and the Chairman of the Straits Exchange Foundation of Taiwan, Chiang 
Pin-kun 江丙坤, also apologized for this statement. Evidently, this report infuriated the 
Chinese authorities. According to the Apple Daily both Tsai Eng-meng and the Taiwan 
Affairs Office of the State Council of the PRC were enraged by the article and, as a re-
sult, the China Times dismissed Editor-in-Chief Hsia Chen (Hsu Pei-chun 徐佩君, et al., 
2010). This incident demonstrated China’s influence over the China Times, but this was 
not an isolated case. According to an interview with a senior journalist, a China Times 
journalist finished a travelogue about China and sent it to the editor for approval. How-
ever, the editor asked the journalist to obtain approval from the Taiwan Affairs Office of 
the State Council of the PRC instead.6
On January 20, 2012 the Washington Post published an interview with Tsai Eng-
meng conducted by its Pulitzer Prize winning journalist, Andrew Higgins. In this inter-
view, Tsai Eng-meng said that when he saw the famous picture of the Tiananmen Square 
Massacre “tank man,” “I realized that not that many people could really have died.” 
Tsai also responded to a question about the discharge of Editor-in-Chief Hsia Chen, 
saying the reason was that he “hurt me by offending people, not just mainlanders.” Tsai 
also believed that China “is very democratic in lots of places (Higgins, 2012).” Tsai’s 
statements, however, infuriated many academics in Taiwan. Consequently, more than 
17 societies, dozens of academics, and more than 600 activists, called for a boycott of the 
Want Want China Times Group (Luo Wei-chih 羅暐智, Su Sheng-yi 蘇聖怡, 2012).7 In 
addition, Tsai Eng-meng told the Washington Post, “whether you like it or not, unifica-
tion is going to happen sooner or later,” and “I really hope that I can see that.” Thus, Tsai 
has displayed his strong identification with the PRC.
6 The author conducted this interview in Taipei on 19 April 2011.
7 Wang Dan, a leader of the Chinese democratic movement in the Tiananmen Square in 1989, was the 
first to urge for a boycott of the Want China Times Group on his Facebook page on 23 January 2012.
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Tsai Eng-meng’s interview with the Washington Post, the self-censorship of the 
China Times, the question of Chinese capital in Tsai’s purchase of the China Times, 
and Tsai’s report to Wang Yi, have aroused considerable criticism in Taiwan. The Apple 
Daily reflected this widespread sentiment and accused Want Want of brainwashing the 
Taiwanese people, propagandizing the CCP’s political ideology, and serving as an agent 
for Beijing to “unify” Taiwan (Apple Daily, 2012). As outlined above, this critique ac-
cords with the evidence, and the Apple Daily’s criticisms that the China Times has be-
come part of the Chinese propaganda effort in Taiwan are persuasive.
China’s Pressure on Taiwannese Media’s Owners
Since the early 1990s, hundreds of thousands of Taiwanese businessmen have in-
vested in China, and this situation has enabled the CCP to influence Taiwanese politics 
and elections (Lin, 2004). Some believe that Taiwanese business tycoons’ vocal support 
of the “1992 consensus,” under the CCP’s pressure, contributed to the DPP’s defeat in 
the 2012 presidential campaign.8 Similarly the CCP has employed the same strategy of 
applying pressure on many other businessmen, particularly on media owners. Taiwan 
has six 24-hour news channels and I take both pro-DPP FTV and pro-DPP SET, as well 
as ERA, as main examples to discuss CCP’s media strategy in Taiwan.
FTV
The birth of the free-to-air Formosan Television Incorporated (民視 Minshi; FTV) in 
1997, broke the monopoly of KMT’s control over free-to-air TV. Because the funds of 
FTV were raised from Taiwan identity people in the early 1990s, FTV announced itself 
as a Taiwanese TV station, which clearly identified China as a different country from 
Taiwan.
The founder of FTV, Chai Trong-rong 蔡同榮 (1935–2014), announced that the pur-
pose of FTV was to protect Taiwan against China and to spread awareness of Taiwanese 
history, geography, culture, customs and languages. He stated that the principal goal of 
FTV was to construct Taiwanese nationalism (Chen Shu-chen 陳淑貞, 2010, p. 35). In 
order to defend the Taiwanese identity, and establish Taiwanese nationalism, FTV uti-
lized many means to integrate the Taiwanese identity into its programs.
Under Chen Shui-bian’s media reform policy, the Legislative Yuan enacted the so-
called “Regulation to Remove Political Parties, the Government and the Military from the 
Media” in 2003. Many critics focused on the relationship between FTV and its founder 
Chai Trong-rong, who was a legislator and a member of the Democratic Progressive 
Party (DPP) Central Standing Committee (CSC) at the time. Despite Chai’s claim that 
he had withdrawn from FTV and stepped down as chairman,9 Chai still had an office at 
8 The author conducted this interview with Poe Ta-chung in Taipei on 4 November 2012.
9 In December 2003, the Legislative Yuan amended three acts-the Cable Radio Act, the Radio and 
Television Act and the Satellite Broadcasting Act to restrict political power in influencing media.
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the station and went to FTV every day. According to Lim It-hong 林一方,10 he often slept 
in his FTV office suite while the chairman of FTV, Tien Tsai-ting 田再庭, only went to 
the office one day per week.11 Many sources indicated that Chai Trong-rong was the real 
boss of FTV, and Chai Trong-rong also used FTV as a bargaining chip to negotiate with 
DPP politicians. For example, when Chai wanted to renew his term as the DPP caucus 
leader of the Legislative Yuan in June 2010, causing his rivals in the DPP to criticize him. 
Chai had hinted that the DPP needed FTV in the 2010 campaign for the mayors of the 
five special municipalities (Lin Ho-ming 林河名, Chao Ta-chih 趙大智, 2010).
In July 2009 the Melbourne International Film Festival’s invitation to the film “The 
Ten Conditions of Love,” a documentary about the Uyghur East Turkistan independence 
movement spiritual leader Rebiya Kadeer, angered China. China thus boycotted this 
film festival and withdrew both Chinese and Hong Kong movies from it. Additionally, 
a Chinese hacker hacked into the official website of the Melbourne International Film 
Festival (Hsu Chien-jung 許建榮, 2009). The DPP decided to support Rebiya Kadeer 
and to launch the showing of this film around Taiwan from August 2009. In the DPP 
CSC, Luo Wen-jia 羅文嘉 suggested that the FTV broadcast this documentary, but Chai 
Trong-rong declined to purchase it. Chai indicated his powerlessness within FTV to the 
DPP CSC, claiming he had no position in FTV.12
According to some articles about FTV, Chai Trong-rong only influenced the News 
Department and could not sway other departments. Despite all Taiwan identity media 
opposing ECFA, the Business Department of FTV won its bid for an ECFA advertise-
ment project from the Ma Ying-jeou government. It was alleged that the News Depart-
ment fought with the Business Department about this. Some people in FTV argued that 
FTV should not have entered a bid for this project, owing to its stance on Taiwan identity 
(Yen Chen-kai 顏振凱, Chang Che-ming 張哲鳴, 2009). Furthermore, the Business De-
partment asked the News Department to restrain its coverage of the DPP’s criticism of 
ECFA (Lin Cho-shui 林濁水, 2009).
The ECFA incident was not the only case of conflict between business and identity. FTV 
also cooperated with the official Chinese TV station China Central Television (CCTV) in 
business, with CCTV broadcasting some Taiwanese-speaking soap dramas obtained from 
FTV and dubbed in Mandarin Chinese.13 Since doing business with CCTV probably vio-
lated Taiwanese law, Lin Cho-shui criticized FTV for illegally cooperating with the of-
ficial Chinese TV station to produce the drama “Dr. Dadaogong” (神醫大道公 Shenyi 
dadaogong).14 As well as producing the ECFA advertisement, in collaboration with the 
KMT, so as to smear Taiwan identity Taiwanese (Lin Cho-shui 林濁水, 2009).15
10 The author conducted this interview with Lim It-hong in Taipei on 17 August 2010. Lim It-hong is 
a Taiwan Independence activist, who was the producer of “feichang guangdie” [Very VCD], a video which 
attacked the KMT Taoyuan County Magistrate candidate, Eric Chu, in the 2005 election campaign.
11 Tien Tsai-ting lives in Taichung, but the FTV office is located in Taipei.
12 The author conducted this interview with Luo Wen-jia in Taipei on 1 October 2009.
13 The author conducted this interview with Sylvia Feng in Taipei on 9 November 2009.
14 This drama was also supervised by the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council of China and 
some other organizations of the “United Front Work” in China.
15 For this advertisement, FTV contrived a “non-standard Mandarin Chinese” speaking comic Tai-
wanese character who opposed ECFA. The character was poorly educated and short-sighted. This eth-
nic discrimination in the ECFA advertisement drew much criticism.
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The above anecdotes point out that FTV put business with China ahead of politics and 
national identity. However, FTV was not the only so-called pro-DPP or Taiwan identity 
medium that contradicted its own political stance. SET was another important instance 
of China’s influence on Taiwan’s media.
SET
As SET (Sanli dianshitai 三立電視台; Sanlih E-Television), FTV, and the Liberty 
Times (Ziyou shibao 自由時報) often attacked President Ma Ying-jeou’s China-friendly 
policies; President Ma called this media trio the “sanmingzhi” [sandwich], which sounds 
similar to san-min-zi-an abbreviation of SET, FTV and the Liberty Times-to express his 
unhappiness with their criticism of him. This suggests SET is a pro-DPP and a Taiwan 
identity TV station. Its firmly pro-DPP and pro-Taiwan stance began in 2005 when SET 
Chairman Lin Kun-hai’s good friend, Frank Hsieh, became Premier. SET’s famous talk 
show program, “Big Talk News” (Dahua xinwen 大話新聞) demonstrated SET’s politi-
cal and national identity. “Big Talk News” started in 2002, and began to reveal DPP and 
Taiwan identity from 2005.16
Due to the high TV rating of “Big Talk News,” the Ma Ying-jeou government moni-
tored the program, and many officers of the Ma government often called in to the pro-
gram during its on-air discussions of Ma’s policies and administration. In addition, the 
popularity and influence of “Big Talk News” also prompted Beijing to monitor it (Chung 
Nien-huang 鍾年晃, 2012, p. 78).
However, SET began to self-censor after Ma’s election in 2008. A senior producer 
contended that “Big Talk News” was troublesome for SET because the KMT held 
power, and SET wanted to do business with China to produce dramas after 2008.17 
For the purpose of expanding the market in China, the former Executive Vice-Pres-
ident of SET, 蘇麗媚 Su Li-mei, served in 2010 as Advisor-in-Chief to the leading 
Chinese online video enterprise Beijing-based “Tudou.com” (Tudouwang 土豆網)18 
to produce TV dramas. Despite the fact that Taiwanese dramas had been popular 
outside of Taiwan, especially in China, SET created a new term “Chinese drama” 
(huaju 華劇) in December 2011 to replace the traditional term “Taiwanese drama” 
(taiju 台劇).19 SET intended to use “Chinese drama” in order to open the overseas 
market. SET President 張榮華 Chang Jung-hua expected the “Chinese drama” to lead 
a “Chinese Wave” (hualiu 華流), similar to the Korean Wave of popular soap-operas 
(Cheng Chiu-shuang 鄭秋霜, 2012).
16 “Big Talk News” remained neutral during the 2004 presidential campaign. President Chen Shui-
bian attended “Big Talk News,” but the other programs of SET also invited the Pan-Blue candidates 
and politicians.
17 The author conducted this interview in Taipei on 4 May 2011.
18 Tudou.com was the first and leading online video platform in China before the challenge of 
Youku.com. Su Li-mei served as the Advisor-in-Chief of Tudou.com from May 2010. In March 2012, 
Youku.com merged with Tudou.com.
19 The first “Chinese drama” was “Zhen’ai zhao mafan 真愛找麻煩” (Inborn Pair) which began 
broadcasting on SET on 13 December 2011.
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Because of SET’s business in China and under pressure from the SET leadership, 
“Big Talk News” was not permitted to discuss the Tiananmen Massacre, the Dalai Lama, 
or Rebiya Kadeer, nor could it criticize China (Chung Nien-huang 鍾年晃, 2012, p. 39). 
In addition, SET even decided not to invite pro-Tibetan independence activist Freddy 
Lim,20 the Chairman of Amnesty International Taiwan, to “Big Talk News” under pres-
sure from the PRC (Chung Nien-huang 鍾年晃, 2012, p. 140). A senior anchorperson of 
SET also verified this, saying that SET restricted the coverage of the Dalai Lama, the 
Tiananmen Square Massacre, and the Falun Gong.21 On July 27, 2011 “Big Talk News” 
criticized China’s high speed railway accident using such titles as “Neglecting human 
rights, suppressing freedom of press, who wants unification?” and “What kind of coun-
try? China destroys evidence in high speed railway accident,” to criticize China. SET 
President Chang Jung-hua phoned the staff of the show and told them not to use such 
strong phrases to criticize China. An informant from SET argued that Chinese Internet 
users could strongly condemn the Chinese government on this tragedy, but “Big Talk 
News” in Taiwan must keep silent.22 Additionally, according to another source, while 
many other media outlets attacked the Want Want China Times Group for Tsai Eng-
meng’s denial of the Tiananmen Square Massacre in an interview with the Washington 
Post in January 2012, SET ordered its talk show programs, including “Big Talk News” 
and “Go New Taiwan” (Xin Taiwan jiayou 新台灣加油) not to discuss the matter.23
During the 2012 presidential campaign, SET sent representatives to negotiate with 
the Chinese authorities to broadcast their TV dramas in China. However, the Chinese au-
thorities implied that if SET did not axe “Big Talk News,” they would prevent SET from 
making money in China (Chung Nien-huang 鍾年晃, 2012, p. 78). After Ma Ying-jeou 
won re-election in 2012, rumors circulated that SET would axe the program. According 
to the same source on June 6, 2012, right after the 2012 election, SET management had 
suggested “Big Talk News” should alter its political identity.
On May 15, 2012, “Big Talk News” interviewed former President Lee Teng-hui. 
The same source pointed out however, on the same day, Vice General-Manager of the 
SET News Department Kao Ming-hui talked with “Big Talk News” host Cheng Hung-
yi 鄭弘儀. He advised that SET had decided to stop the show in June. Subsequently, 
SET axed “Big Talk News” at the end of May 2012. Many sources have discussed the 
potential motivations for SET canceling “Big Talk News,” the most plausible being 
pressure from Beijing as SET attempts to break into the Chinese TV market (Wu Chih-
wei 吳志偉, 2012). Ma Wei-ming 馬維敏, the Editor-in-Chief of the pro-democratic 
Apple Daily, responded to this incident. Wei-ming said that the “China factor” could 
determine the content of a Taiwanese TV program, as well as a program’s host, and asked 
what would be next. Ma Wei-min argues that Taiwan’s media and journalists have to be 
aware of the return of the “Taiwan Garrison Command (Ma Wei-min 馬維敏, 2012).” 
In summary, the “China factor” has deeply impacted SET, causing it to self-censor and 
even terminate a popular program.
20 Freddy Lim became a Legislator in 2016.
21 The author conducted this interview in Taipei on 4 May 2011.
22 The author conducted this interview in Taipei on 17 August 2011.
23 The author conducted this interview via email on 6 June 2012. The interviewee is a senior staff 
member of SET.
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ERA
SET serves as a good example of how the Chinese successfully put pressure on 
a medium, which intended to do business in China. Narratives from ERA Communi-
cations (Niandai dianshitai 年代電視台; ERA) show how the Taiwan Affairs Office 
of the Chinese State Council, intervened in Taiwan’s TV programs. During the 2012 
presidential election ERA tended to support James Soong and its famous talk show 
program “Facing News” (Xinwen mian dui mian 新聞面對面), often criticized Ma 
Ying-jeou. This political stance angered the CCP. According to an interview, because 
the Chairman of ERA Lien Tai-sheng 練台生, had some business in China, the Taiwan 
Affairs Office officials ordered the ERA officials to file a report with them. Lien Tai-
sheng sent Executive Vice-President Yen Chih-ching to visit Beijing three times, but 
the Chinese authorities were unhappy until Lien Tai-sheng personally visited Beijing 
himself to “make a report.”24
In fact, the Liberty Times has also revealed some similar stories. The Taiwan Affairs 
Office of the Chinese State Council often interfered in Taiwanese media’s comments and 
coverage on China. Some media received “complaints” from the Taiwan Affairs Office 
and some media officials also visited Beijing to be educated by such Chinese officials 
as the spokesman for the Taiwan Affairs Office, Yang Yi 陳毅 (Tzou Jing-wen 鄒景雯, 
2011).
Of course, China’s pressure did not only happen to the three media outlets above. 
For instance, The Journalist became more critical of China in mid-2012; causing one of 
main shareholders of The Journalist, who intended to conduct business in China, some 
trouble. Consequently, Editor-in-Chief Ku Pi-ling 古碧玲, who published some special 
issues on Chinese affairs in order to criticize China, stepped down in January 2013 (Citi-
zen Journalism, 2013).
In short, stories in FTV, SET and ERA show different aspects of China’s influence 
on Taiwan’s media. For FTV, although it maintained its firmly pro-DPP and Taiwan in-
dependence position, it conceded its political stance to China when negotiating business 
in relation to China. SET’s story also demonstrated how China’s pressure impacted its 
programs when SET dealt with business in China. What happened with ERA indicated 
that the Chinese authorities could directly influence Taiwan’s media, particularly if they 
had business in China.
China’s Embedded Advertising/Advertorials in Taiwan’s Media
Another important source of Chinese influence on Taiwan’s media is the placement 
of advertisements, in the form of apparent news coverage (zhiruxing xinwen 置入性新
聞; embedded advertising or advertorials), in Taiwanese media. The Want Want China 
Times Group played an important role in this through helping the Chinese authorities 
place these items in Taiwan’s media.
24 The author conducted this interview in Taipei on 15 August 2012. The interviewee is a senior 
journalist.
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The Control Yuan member Frank Wu 吳豐山, in November 2010, made an investiga-
tion that confirmed China’s advertorials in the China Times were in violation of Taiwan’s 
legal regulations. In fact, examples of such advertorials could be found in both the China 
Times and the United Daily News (Lianhebao 聯合報) (Shih, 2010). According to the 
Foundation for the Advancement of Media Excellence (Xinwen gonghai fangzhi jijinhui 
新聞公害防治基金會), illegal Chinese advertising in Taiwan’s media had reached 269 
instances within two years. For instance, 25 Chinese advertisements were embedded 
in the United Daily News and the United Evening News (Lianhe wanbao 聯合晚報) in 
November 2012 (Huang Yi-ching 黃以敬, 2013). Informants indicated that Want Want 
was actually the agent helping the Chinese authorities to place embedded advertising in 
Taiwan’s media.25
In March 2012 the Governor of China’s Fujian Province, Su Shulin 蘇樹林, visited 
Taiwan and the China Times reported details of Su Shulin’s visit. New Talk (Xintouke) 
revealed a China Times document entitled “The 2012 Propaganda Plan of the Gover-
nor of Fujian Province’s Visit to Taiwan” (Erlingyi’er Fujian sheng shengzheng fantai 
xuanchuan jihua 2012福建省省長訪台宣傳計畫), and made a detailed report about 
this propaganda plan and the coverage of the China Times, but the China Times still 
denied this. The Fujian Province authorities, however, admitted that this was a mat-
ter between the Fujian Province authorities and the Want China Times Group (Lin 
Chau-yi 林朝億, 2012). Finally, the Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) Chairwoman 
Lai Shin-yuan 賴幸媛 confirmed New Talk’s coverage in the Legislative Yuan, and 
the China Times was fined NT$400,000 by the Ministry of Economic Affairs (Chen 
Hung-chin 陳虹瑾, 2012).
Chang Chin-hwa 張錦華, a professor at National Taiwan University, said that “the 
China Times accepted embedded advertising from the Chinese government and has 
a reputation for always publishing good news about China and leaving out the bad (Jang 
Show-ling 鄭秀玲, 2011).” Chang Chin-hwa thus argued, “It was the darkest moment 
for freedom of speech in Taiwan (Tai Chih-chuan 戴智權, 2011).” The Want Want China 
Times Group even sued the media academics that had criticized the Want Want China 
Times Group. In an interview with the Liberty Times Chang Chin-hwa said that the Chi-
na Times presented advertorials paid for by the Chinese government as “news,” and also 
served as an agency for the Chinese authorities to help China to buy “news” in the United 
Daily News, illegal activities according to Taiwan’s regulations. Chang Chin-hwa was 
also concerned that the purchasing of “news” by the Chinese authorities would make 
Taiwanese media a megaphone for China, so as to propagandize Chinese official ideol-
ogy and to control news coverage in Taiwan. Chang Chin-hwa further connected these 
Chinese embedded advertisings to Hu Jintao’s idea of media warfare against Taiwan, 
which involved “Entering the Island [of Taiwan], Entering the Household, and Enter-
ing the Mind” (rudao ruhu ru’nao 入島 入戶 入腦) (Tzou Jing-wen 鄒景雯, 2011). Hu 
Jintao’s idea was a unification strategy against Taiwan, through Chinese propaganda in 
Taiwan’s media. In light of the revelations about Want Want it is entirely possible that the 
China Times is one means through which Hu’s idea of propaganda permeating through 
Taiwan, has been put into practice.
25 The author conducted these interviews in Taiwan on 14 April, 19 April and 26 July, 2011.
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The Controversy on the Sale of pro-Democratic Taiwan Next Media  
and Anti-Media Monopoly Movement
In 2012, despite pro-democratic Taiwan Next Media’s popularity among Taiwan-
ese, the owner, Jimmy Lai decided to sell the media. There were many reasons for Lai 
selling Taiwan Next Media, the main motivation being the huge losses of Next TV 
(Yi dianshi 壹電視).26 Jimmy Lai established Next TV in July 2009, but did not receive 
a broadcasting license until July 2011. Lai believed the Ma Ying-jeou government was 
tightening controls on Taiwan’s press and intentionally obstructing Next TV’s license ap-
plication (Lai, 2010). In addition, more than a quarter of Taiwan’s cable systems, which 
were under the influence of Tsai Eng-meng’s Want Want China Times Group, such as 
the China Network Systems, blocked Next TV after it received the license. This further 
contributed to Next Media’s losses.27 Spokesman of Next TV Chang Hsiu-che 張修哲 
said that Next TV had actually reached a deal with CNS, to broadcast Next TV’s pro-
grams on CNS’s channels. However, the CCP received this information and requested 
that Tsai Eng-meng block Next TV (Chung Nien-huang 鍾年晃, 2012, pp. 94–95). In 
fact, another main cable TV system, Kbor (Kaibo 凱擘), which owns 12 cable TV sys-
tems and has more than 1.1 million subscribers (by households), also blocked Next TV. 
Kbor belonged to the Fubon Group (Fubang jituan), and Fubon operated many banks 
in both Hong Kong and China. This business probably explains why Kbro also blocked 
pro-democratic Next TV.28
In an interview, Columnist of the Apple Daily Antonio Chiang suggested three fac-
tors involved in Jimmy Lai’s decision to sell Next Media. The first is the huge losses 
mentioned above. The second is that Lai had grown tired of fighting the pro-China Ma 
Ying-jeou government and the Want Want China Times Group. The third, Jimmy Lai was 
disappointed with Taiwan’s democracy, which happened to be the reason for Lai coming 
to Taiwan in 2001. Chiang further added that the KMT actively suppresses Next Media 
while the DPP does not offer any support, and thus such a political environment may also 
have been a factor in Lai stepping away.29 Additionally, the editorial writer of the Apple 
Daily, Poe Ta-chung; believed the sale of Next Media would result from a conspiracy 
of the KMT and the CCP. Poe added that the KMT first intentionally delayed Next TV’s 
broadcast license and the cable TV systems; while owners who have much business in 
China blocked Next TV, after it received a license.30
The main parties in the purchase of Next Media included China Trust Charity Foun-
dation Chairman Jeffrey Koo Jr. 辜仲諒, Formosa Plastics Group Chairman William 
Wong 王文淵, and Want Want China Times Group Chairman Tsai Eng-meng among 
others. Poe Ta-chung believed that Tsai Eng-meng’s becoming closer to the Chinese au-
26 Jimmy Lai founded Next Media in Hong Kong in 1990, where Next Media first published 
the Next Magazine and the Apple Daily. The Taiwan Next Media started to publish the Taiwan Next 
Magazine (Yizhoukan) in 2001, the Taiwan Apple Daily in 2003 and to establish Next TV in 2009.
27 CNS owns 11 cable TV systems with more than 1 million subscribers (by household). The Want 
Want China Times Group also owns 3 other cable TV systems with more than 200 thousand subscribers 
(by household).
28 In the beginning, Fubon was one of the potential buyers in the sale of Taiwan Next Media.
29 The author conducted this interview with Antonio Chiang in Taipei on 4 November 2012.
30 The author conducted this interview with Poe Ta-chung in Taipei on 4 November 2012.
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thorities after purchasing the China Times Group, had encouraged both Koo and Wang to 
buy Next Media.31 In the beginning, many suspected capital supposedly from Singapore 
was actually from Tsai Eng-meng. President of the Apple Daily Union Tsai Jih-yun 
蔡日雲 also suspected it, but both Jeffery Koo and Jimmy Lai denied it. No evidence 
showed that the Chinese authorities got directly involved with the purchase of Taiwan 
Next Media, but both the Formosa Plastics Group and China Trust have significant cor-
porate interests in China. Poe Ta-chung believed that Next Media would not maintain 
a pro-democratic position after a takeover by any tycoon.32
Still, the sale of the pro-democratic Taiwan Next Media deeply shocked many in Tai-
wan. Because pro-CCP Tsai Eng-meng was involved, many Taiwanese students launched 
a campaign opposing the sale. Actually, before the sale of Taiwan Next Media, students 
had already launched some protests against the Want Want China Times Group. In July 
2012 the National Communications Commission (NCC) gave conditional approval to 
Want Want China Times Group’s acquisition, of the cable TV services owned by the Chi-
na Network Systems (Zhongjia wangle 中嘉網路; CNS). In response to this trade, Ketty 
Chen, a political scientist at National Taiwan University, said, “People are extremely 
uncomfortable to the point of being angry at him, knowing that he has a pro-China stance 
and that he has publicly advocated that Taiwan be part of China.” Ketty Chen added that 
“That’s the main reason why people don’t want him to become the Rupert Murdoch of 
Taiwan (Mishkin, 2012).”
On July 31, 2012 hundreds of students protested against this trade because they be-
lieved that it would make Want Want a media “monster,” which would monopolize Tai-
wan’s media market and limit Taiwan’s freedom of the press. On the same day some 
academics, including Dr. Huang Kuo-chang, hosted a press conference with more than 
ten TV stations in attendance to support the students. However, only Next TV broadcast 
this press conference. All other TV stations self-censored the press conference as well as 
the student protest, because their media owners would not displease Tsai Eng-meng and 
risk their right to broadcast their programs on CNS (Chung Nien-huang 鍾年晃, 2012, 
pp. 81–85).
In addition, Want Want intentionally tried to discredit Dr. Huang Kuo-chang 黃國昌 by 
contriving fake news to attack him.33 Want Want accused Dr. Huang of paying students 
to attend a protest against Want Want. This incident angered students and netizens, with 
numerous netizens blaming Want Want for the scandal (Loa, 2012a). One month later 
the group apologized to Dr. Huang, saying it had no proof he had done so (Shan, 2012). 
On September 1, 2012, Journalists’ Day, thousands of students, journalists, academics, 
and social activists took to the streets in Taipei. They protested against Want Want’s mo-
nopolisation of the media, and demand that the NCC help break monopolization of the 
media (Loa, 2012b).
As a measure to protest Want Want’s acquisition of Next Media, Taiwanese students 
launched a campaign entitled “Anti-Media Monopoly,” declaring “Oppose media mo-
nopoly, reject the black hand of China, uphold freedom of the press” around the world. 
Not only did thousands of overseas Taiwanese students and young people join the cam-
31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Huang Kuo-chang became a Legislator in 2016.
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paign, but so did some foreign academics such as; Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
Professor Noam Chomsky, New York University Professor Ned Block, Monash Univer-
sity Professor Bruce Jacobs and Hamline University Professor Richard Kagan.
According to Freedom House’s Freedom in the World 2013; both deals, Want Want’s 
acquisition of CNS, and the sale of Next Media to a consortium comprised of some indi-
viduals who had substantial business interests in China, could negatively affect diversity 
and press freedom in Taiwan (Tsao, Hsu, 2013). For the students the sale of Next Media 
chiefly raised concerns about Tsai’s intention to monopolize Taiwan’s media, and his 
relationship with the Chinese authorities.
Consequently, Tsai Eng-meng’s Want Want China Times Group’s actions were the 
main drive behind the students’ launch of a campaign to safeguard Taiwan’s freedom of 
the press and to oppose media monopoly. However, because some famous and impor-
tant international scholars supported this movement, the Want Want China Times Group 
attacked those students and claimed that Noam Chomsky, along with Ned Block, were 
“misled” by not having the full content of the Chinese message on the placard explained 
to them (Cole, 2013). The controversy centered on the part of the text that read in Man-
darin: “Say no to China’s black hands,” a reference to Chinese influence in Taiwanese 
media (Cole, 2013). A few days later, Noam Chomsky denied he was misled and reiter-
ated his support for the anti-monopoly movement. Chomsky said that he was under the 
impression that the poster called for freedom of press and opposed media monopoliza-
tion, and said nothing about China. He assumed it was simply a misunderstanding, re-
sulting from the fact that he could not read (Cole, 2013; Rawnsley, 2013).
Yet, after several months, this controversial media deal collapsed as Tsai Eng-meng 
decided to withdraw. There were rumors around this collapse, with one source indicat-
ing that the CCP had lost patience with Tsai and his inability to take over the media 
in Taiwan.34 Mark Simon, the spokesman for Jimmy Lai’s Next Media in Hong Kong, 
said, “Beijing didn’t want a cashed up Jimmy Lai.” Simon also suggested that perhaps 
“mainland China sent a message out that this is not a necessary fight to have” (Mullany, 
2013). Consequently, Next Media Group Chairman Jimmy Lai promised that he would 
not attempt to sell his print businesses in Taiwan, because the businesses were profitable 
(Wang, Kao, 2013). However, Jimmy Lai did sell Next TV to ERA Chairman Lien Tai-
sheng on June 1, 2013. No matter what was the real factor in the collapse of this sale, this 
result can be viewed as a victory for those who oppose a media monopoly in Taiwan and 
those who counter China’s intention to influence Taiwan’s media.
But, right after the end of the anti-media monopoly movement, the Cross-Strait 
Agreement on Trade in Services signed between Cross-Strait representatives on 21 June 
2013 has resulted in many new concerns for a vast number of Taiwanese.35 Critics argue 
that the agreement will threaten Taiwan’s freedom of the press, freedom of speech and 
freedom on the Internet (Chen, Chun, 2013; Lin, 2013).
Professor Jang Show-ling 鄭秀玲 at National Taiwan University believes that 
allowing Chinese investment in printing poses risks to freedom of speech (Chen, Chun, 
34 The author obtained this source from a Google Group discussion on 26 March 2013. The 
informant is a foreign journalist in Taiwan.
35 Due to its controversy, the Legislative Yuan has of December 2013 not yet approved the 
agreement, which is necessary before it comes into force.
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2013). Professor Chang Chin-hwa considers that the agreement in printing shows 
China’s intention to influence Taiwan’s press (Peng Hsien-chun 彭顯鈞, Chen Hui-
ping 陳慧萍, 2013). Senior journalist Chung Nien-huang 鍾年晃 said that Chinese-run 
print services in Taiwan will potentially restrict Taiwan’s freedom of speech at crucial 
moments such as during elections and in Cross-Strait issues.36 However, President of 
Business Today (Jin zhoukan 今周刊), Liang Yung-haung 梁永煌, and CEO of Taiwan’s 
biggest publishing group, Cite Media Holding Group, Ho Fei-peng 何飛鵬, believe that 
the service pact will not influence Taiwan’s press because of Taiwan’s democracy and 
free market.37 They added if Chinese-run printing services intend to influence Taiwan’s 
press, Taiwanese publishers could choose other printing services. Still, Liang believes 
that China’s flat advertising in Taiwan will restrict Taiwan’s freedom of speech in the 
press, though the agreement does not include flat advertising.
The service pacts also cover communications services, including the Internet, which 
has become one of Taiwan’s major concerns with regards to national security and freedom 
of speech. Professor Lin Ying-dar 林盈達 at National Chiao Tung University thinks 
that category-2 telecommunications services will not only threaten Taiwan’s national 
security and privacy, but also freedom of speech.38 Owing to the pact’s inclusion of 
Internet service providers (ISP), Lin believes that Chinese-run ISPs may censor “sensitive 
issues” or block news websites just as Beijing does in Chinese cyberspace. To conclude, 
the Cross-Strait Agreement on Trade in Services is also considered a threat to Taiwan’s 
media, especially on the Internet.
* * *
Chinese influence on Taiwan’s media has been steadily expanding since Ma Ying-
jeou came to power in 2008. First, the PRC could use economic affiliation as a means 
to co-opt some Taiwanese media, manage the coverage and criticism of China in Tai-
wan’s media by means of media acquisition by pro-China capitalists. Therefore the 
PRC uses pro-Beijing tycoons, to control Taiwan’s media. The Want Want China Times 
Group presented itself to be a typical example in this respect. Second, as the politi-
cal orientation of tycoons or businessmen is generally linked with their business, the 
PRC cunningly put pressure on those Taiwanese media owners who have invested or 
intend to invest in China. Thus those Taiwanese media outlets will side with China, 
or self-sensor, in any issue related to China. Evidently, the cases of the Want Want 
China Times Group, FTV, SET and ERA indicate China’s success in this strategy. 
Although FTV and SET sided with the DPP and Taiwan identity, following China’s 
subtle tactics, both had to surrender their political identity to China in consideration 
of their business with China. Third, the Chinese authorities have published certain 
types of advertisements in the form of news coverage in Taiwanese media. The PRC’s 
placing advertising and advertorials in Taiwan’s media facilitates influence by being 
36 The author conducted this interview in Taipei on 3 December 2013.
37 The author conducted the interview with Liang Yung-huang in Taipei on 19 November 2013 and 
Ho Fei-peng in Taipei on 20 November 2013.
38 The author conducted this interview with Lin Ying-dar through email on 12 December 2013.
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a source of advertising revenue, thereby making Taiwan’s media a propaganda agent 
of the Chinese authorities. Finally, the sale of the pro-democratic Apple Daily worried 
Taiwanese students and academics about Taiwan’s freedom of press even though this 
media deal was to end in a controversial collapse.
Above all, increasing and closer Cross-Strait economic ties has put China in a domi-
nant position in respect to some Taiwanese media. For these media, Chinese marketing 
consideration of Taiwan media industry had combined with pressure to move away from 
criticism of China. For those media proprietors, particularly tycoons, the market is king 
and Taiwan’s freedom of the press and political self-determination is not much of a con-
sideration.
Taiwan’s democracy and freedom of the press, its free capital markets, and the in-
creasing and closer economic integration between Taiwan and China, provide Chinese 
authorities with an opportunity to use Taiwanese businessmen to influence Taiwan’s me-
dia outlets. China uses three inter-related strategies to influence Taiwan’s media in this 
way: persuading businessmen with pro-China views to purchase Taiwanese media out-
lets, pressuring existing media owners, and placing advertisements in Taiwan’s media in 
order to purchase influence. There is increasing concern in Taiwan that these strategies 
are eroding freedom of the press.
Actually, the Internet has currently become another new strategy to influence Taiwan’s 
media outlet and politics after Tsai Ing-wen came to power in 2016. It is believed that 
the Chinese government relies on “news content farms (內容農場 neirong nong chang)” 
outlets in mainland China, that generate and distribute fake news/disinformation that 
attack Taiwanese political parties and politicians (Chen Liang-yen 陳諒言, 2016, pp. 
22–27). In the absence of systematic filtering, these fake news and disinformation could 
easily shape people’s political views and influence Taiwan’s politics. Therefore, we 
should pay attention to China’s new and ongoing cyber-propaganda strategy.
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Streszczenie
Tajwańska demokracja oraz wolność prasy stwarzają możliwości dla władz Chińskiej Republiki 
Ludowej, aby poprzez tajwańskich biznesmenów, wpływać na treści prezentowane w mediach i kon-
sekwentnie na politykę Tajwanu. Władze ChRL używają trzech powiązanych ze sobą strategii wywie-
rania wpływu na tajwańskie media: nakłaniając pro-chińskich biznesmenów to zakupu tajwańskich 
mediów, naciskając na istniejących właścicieli mediów oraz umieszczając reklamy w tajwańskich me-
diach w celu uzyskania wpływu politycznego w zamian za przychody z tytułu publikowania ów reklam. 
Dodatkowo rząd ChRL używa specjalistów od cyberpropagandy, w celu atakowania konkretnych partii 
politycznych oraz polityków na Tajwanie.
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